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ABSTRACT
Federal trademark-registration rights have grown in import, and 
trademark owners have taken notice. In the fiscal year of 2018, over 
660,000 federal trademark registration applications were filed with the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“Trademark Office”), representing 
a 60 percent increase from a decade prior. Yet despite the fact that there 
is growing concern that the Trademark Office is routinely issuing 
inconsistent trademark determinations, systematic empirical studies of 
the administrative process of obtaining federal registration rights are 
virtually nonexistent. This Article begins to close this gap by 
conducting the first large-scale study of trademark officials, known as 
trademark-examining attorneys, who make the initial determination on 
whether to accept or decline a federal trademark registration. Utilizing 
a novel dataset comprising over 7.8 million trademark applications, 
this Article examines the extent to which trademark-examining 
attorneys’ determinations differ from one another. We find substantial 
heterogeneity in Trademark Office outcomes. Trademark-examining 
attorneys have wildly divergent publication rates and registration rates 
even while controlling for a range of characteristics of the applications. 
The duration of time an application is before the Trademark Office 
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also varies considerably among trademark-examining attorneys as 
does whether a filed opposition is sustained.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (the 
“Trademark Office” or “Agency”) has managed to jostle its way from 
the legal periphery into the mainstream. For example, the Agency 
made national headlines in 2014 when it canceled the Washington 
Redskins’ federal registration of the REDSKINS trademark, finding 
that the term was disparaging to a considerable composite of Native 
Americans.1 The Trademark Office continued to gain traction in 2015, 
1. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1082 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see
Ken Belson & Edward Wyatt, Redskins Lose Ruling on Trademarks, but Fight Isn’t Over, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/sports/football/us-patent-office-
cancels-redskins-trademark-registration.html [https://perma.cc/Y4GU-Z9JL]; Jacob Gershman, 
Ashby Jones & Kevin Clark, U.S. Patent Office Cancels Washington Redskins Trademarks, WALL 
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when the Supreme Court substantially elevated the impact of the 
Trademark Office’s determination to uphold or deny federal 
registration of a mark by holding that the Agency’s decision could have 
preclusive effect on a later infringement action involving the same 
mark.2 In that same year, the significance of the Trademark Office’s 
decisions was further enhanced by federal courts suggesting that the 
denial of federal registration to a mark forecloses the possibility of 
pursuing a federal unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act— 
meaning only state law protection would remain.3 Finally, in 2017 and 
2019, the Agency made more headlines when the Supreme Court held 
that the Trademark Office’s application of the ban on registering 
disparaging marks and scandalous or immoral marks was 
unconstitutional.4 
The growing import of federal registration of trademarks has not 
been lost on trademark owners. As of the end of the 2018 fiscal year, 
there were a staggering 2.4 million active federal trademark 
registrations in the United States.5 During that same year, 660,000 
ST. J. (June 14, 2014, 8:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-patent-office-cancels-
washington-redskins-trademarks-1403103213 [https://perma.cc/ZK99-7G5Z]; Theresa Vargas, 
U.S. Patent Office Cancels Redskins Trademark Registration, Says Name Is Disparaging, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/us-patent-office-cancels-redskins-
trademark-registration-says-name-is-disparaging/2014/06/18/e7737bb8-f6ee-11e3-8aa9dad2ec03978 
9_story.html [https://perma.cc/G5HK-AD84]. The decision actually canceled six Redskins 
registrations associated with football services that were filed from 1967 to 1990. Blackhorse, 111 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082–84. The Blackhorse decision was rendered moot by the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
2. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 160 (2015). 
3. See infra note 11. 
4. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (holding that the Lanham Act’s 
provision prohibiting the registration of immoral or scandalous trademarks violated the First 
Amendment); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (same); Sarah Jeong, Should We Be Able to Reclaim a 
Racist Insult—as a Registered Trademark?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/magazine/should-we-be-able-to-reclaim-a-racist-insult-as-a-
registered-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/4HMZ-H77W]; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Strikes Down Law Barring Vulgar Trademarks, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-vulgar-trademarks-foia.html
[https://perma.cc/L2PZ-78LG]; Diana Michele Yap, He Named His Band the Slants to Reclaim a 
Slur. Not Everyone Approved., WASH. POST (May 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/he-named-his-band-the-slants-to-reclaim
-a-slur-not-everyone-approved/2019/05/15/b939275a-700d-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/RA8M-E84T]. 
5. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2019 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 181 tbl.15 [hereinafter 2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT] (noting that there were 2,415,550 active certificates of registration for trademarks in 
2018). 
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federal registration applications were filed with the Trademark 
Office—a 60 percent increase from a decade prior.6 Yet despite the 
increasing significance of federal registration rights, there is growing 
concern that the Agency is routinely issuing inconsistent trademark 
determinations. Consider, for example, the recent controversy 
associated with the Trademark Office’s review of the mark “The 
Vegan Butcher.”7 The Agency refused Herbivorous Butcher’s 
trademark-registration application for the mark “The Vegan Butcher” 
for meat substitutes on the grounds it was merely descriptive.8 Shortly 
thereafter, a different trademark official at the Trademark Office 
approved Sweet Earth Foods’s federal registration application for the 
same mark for the same goods.9 Examples like this suggest that the 
Trademark Office’s decision to grant a federal trademark registration 
is driven not only by the merits of the application but also by the 
proclivities of the trademark official to whom the application is 
randomly assigned. 
Despite anecdotal evidence that trademark-registration 
requirements are being inconsistently applied across trademark 
officials, systematic empirical studies of the administrative process 
behind obtaining federal registration rights are virtually nonexistent.10 
This Article begins to close this gap in the literature by conducting the 
first large-scale study of trademark officials, known as trademark-
examining attorneys, who make the initial determination on whether 
to accept or decline a federal trademark registration. 
6. See id. (noting that the Trademark Office registered 367,382 trademark applications and 
273,808 applications were abandoned); id. at 182 tbl.16 (stating that the Trademark Office 
received 401,392 trademark registration applications in 2008 and 638,847 trademark registration 
applications in 2018). 
7. See  Jelisa Castrodale, America’s First ‘Vegan Butcher’ Is Fighting Nestle Over the Term’s 
Trademark, VICE (Dec. 3, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x5g3a/americas-
first-vegan-butcher-is-fighting-nestle-over-the-terms-trademark [https://perma.cc/58SU-YESJ]; 
Mark Reilly, Feds Told Herbivorous Butcher ‘No’ on Trademark, but Gave It to Nestlé,
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Nov. 18, 2019, 8:19 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/ 
twincities/news/2019/11/18/feds-told-herbivorous-butcher-no-on-trademark-but.html [https://perma.cc/
P5EU-LD88]. 
8. Id.
 9. Id.
 10. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Galen Hancock, Alan C. Marco & Amanda Fila Myers, The 
USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 669, 671 (2013) (noting that empirical “studies using U.S. administrative [trademark] 
data remain scarce”). In fact, trademark literature more generally has tended to ignore the role 
of trademark registration. See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in 
Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 870–71 (2017) (“Foundational 
critiques of modern trademark law tend not to address the role of registration.”).  
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Utilizing a novel dataset comprising over 7.8 million trademark 
applications, this Article examines the extent to which trademark-
examining attorneys’ determinations differ from one another. We find 
substantial heterogeneity in Trademark Office outcomes. Namely, 
trademark-examining attorneys have wildly divergent publication rates 
and registration rates even while controlling for a range of application 
characteristics.11 Moreover, the duration of time an application is 
before the Trademark Office also varies considerably among 
trademark-examining attorneys as does whether a filed opposition is 
sustained. 
The above results are concerning for several reasons. To begin, 
the fact that there are substantially divergent registration rates among 
trademark-examining attorneys is highly suggestive that the 
Trademark Office is regularly getting the decision to grant or deny 
registration wrong. The trademark-registration standards are set to 
generally track the economic justifications for trademarks, which are 
to decrease consumer search costs without overly restricting certain 
marketplace competition while securing for the mark’s owner the 
goodwill of her business.12 As a result, if trademark-examining 
attorneys are routinely denying registrations on valid marks, then the 
Trademark Office is depriving the most worthy applications of the 
substantial expansion in rights associated with federal registration.  
Alternatively, if trademark-examining attorneys are registering 
invalid trademarks, these trademarks may impose the costs of 
additional federal registration rights on society without producing any 
of the benefits. Moreover, because trademark-registration 
determinations can become “incontestable,” which limits the grounds 
upon which the mark’s validity may be challenged in trademark-
infringement litigation, the application of the trademark-registration 
11. There is some disagreement as to whether a mark that is denied federal registration can 
be enforced as an unregistered mark under § 43(a), the unfair competition claim section of the 
Lanham Act. Recently, a district court decision held that marks barred from registration could 
not be enforced under § 43(a). See Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 321 (D.N.J. 
2014). And at least one Federal Circuit judge has also taken this position. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 
567, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., concurring) (“Equally clear, however, is that § 43(a) 
protection is only available for unregistered trademarks that could have qualified for federal 
registration.”). Nevertheless, several trademark scholars suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Mark P. 
McKenna, The Implications of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., PATENTLY-O (June 19, 2014), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/implications-blackhorse-football.html [http://perma.cc/
N6LY-QZCR].
 12. See Melissa F. Wasserman, What Administrative Law Can Teach the Trademark System, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1511, 1520–21 (2016). 
??????? ? ??????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
  
 
 
  
  
    
  
  
 
  
       
1812 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1807? 
requirements matter beyond the mere grant of additional registration 
rights.13 Thus, if the Trademark Office incorrectly granted the federal 
trademark application on “The Vegan Butcher” because the mark 
merely describes meat substitutes, then Sweet Earth Foods would be 
able to unfairly burden new entrants’ ability to communicate with 
consumers in the marketplace.14 
Irrespective of concerns with the quality of examination, 
inconsistent Trademark Office decisions also raise issues about equity. 
The dominant theories of administrative justice, such as Professor 
Jerry Mashaw’s theory of “bureaucratic rationality,” hold that 
uniformity in agency outcomes is an important goal.15 This concern is 
also implicated in the “The Vegan Butcher” example, as the attorney 
for Herbivorous Butcher was quick to point out “[i]f it’s merely 
descriptive for us, then it should be merely descriptive for [Sweet Earth 
Foods].”16 Finally, to the extent that trademark-registration decisions 
are being driven by the idiosyncratic views of the trademark-examining 
attorney reviewing the application, rendering the registration of 
trademarks arbitrary or unpredictable, then First Amendment 
concerns may also be implicated.17 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I 
introduces the implications of federal registration of trademarks, the 
administrative process associated with trademark registration, and the 
harms associated with inconsistent Trademark Office outcomes. Part 
II describes our data set and methodology utilized. Part III presents 
the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, Part IV begins to explore 
the implications of our results. 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)–(6) (2018).
14. As discussed in Part II, the exclusive rights associated with a mark that otherwise 
qualifies for protection originate from the use of the mark in commerce, not its federal 
registration. Thus, Sweet Earth Foods should not be able to prevent Herbivorous Butcher from 
continuing to use the mark in Minneapolis but Nestlé could, for example, hamper Herbivorous 
Butcher’s ability to use the mark if Herbivorous Butcher expanded into other geographical 
markets. 
 15. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 25–26 (1983); Robert A. Kagan, Inside Administrative Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 816, 820 (1984) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983)). 
16. Castrodale, supra note 7. 
 17. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Immoral or Scandalous Marks: An Empirical 
Analysis, 8 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 169, 197–203 (2019). 
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by outlining the goals of trademark law and the 
rights that flow from federal registration of a trademark. It then 
provides an overview of the federal registration process and describes 
the harms associated with inconsistent Trademark Office outcomes. 
A. The Goals of Trademark Law and the Significance of Trademark 
Registration 
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, design, or combination 
thereof that identifies and distinguishes goods and services of one party 
from those of another.18 For instance, trademark protection enables 
consumers who are shopping for sparkling water to rely on the 
presence of the TOPO CHICO mark as an indicator of the sparkling 
water’s quality to which that mark is affixed. Consumers who 
previously had a good experience with TOPO CHICO sparkling water 
can simply look for the TOPO CHICO mark the next time they go 
shopping for sparkling water or order a sparkling water in a restaurant. 
First-time customers can rely on the TOPO CHICO mark as shorthand 
for information they have learned from advertising or by word of 
mouth. 
Marks serve this search-cost reduction function only to the extent 
the trademark owner can stop others from using the same mark on 
confusingly similar products. For example, if another company could 
label its sparkling water TOPO CHICO, consumers would no longer 
be able to rely on the TOPO CHICO mark to indicate a quality signal. 
As a result, consumers would have to rely upon alternative, 
presumably more costly, mechanisms to verify the attributes of the 
product. Moreover, because trademark law “helps assure a producer 
that it—and not an imitating competitor—will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product,”19 the 
producer of TOPO CHICO sparkling water has an incentive to 
produce goods of a consistent quality.20 
 18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Technically, a trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design 
that identifies and distinguishes the source of the good of one party from those of others. A service 
mark is a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design that identifies and distinguishes the source of a 
service rather than goods. We utilize the term trademark in this Article to refer to both 
trademarks and service marks. 
19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1994). 
 20. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 
2108 (2004) (“[I]f consumers lacked the ability to distinguish one brand from another, firms would 
have no reason to create brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics.”).
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This example helps illustrate the standard justifications of 
trademark law: to reduce the costs to a consumer of searching for goods 
that satisfy her preferences without overly restricting marketplace 
competition, and to create incentives to preserve and improve product 
quality by enhancing the communication of quality-related 
information to consumers.21 These justifications for trademark law 
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court22 and have had an 
enormous influence in the shaping of trademark scholarship.23 
The U.S. trademark system is often referred to as a “use-based” 
rather than a “registration-based” system.24 In other words, the 
21. The vast majority of scholars use the rhetoric of search costs to describe the normative 
goals of trademark law. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 & n.2 (2003) (summarizing consumer-
search-costs literature); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223 (2007) (noting that “the search 
costs theory of trademark law has attracted a substantial following among both commentators 
and courts”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 
VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2012) (stating that an “overwhelming majority of scholars use search costs 
language to describe trademark law’s purposes”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
recognized that trademark law’s core theoretical justification is to reduce consumer search costs: 
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 
“reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” for it 
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this 
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she 
liked (or disliked) in the past. 
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994)). 
Although the dominant theoretical account of trademark law is rooted in economics, 
scholars have posited other justifications for trademark protection. For instance, Barton Beebe 
has argued a “semiotic” account of trademark law that considers consumers’ demand for “signs, 
distinctions, [and] differences.” Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 704 (2004). Robert Bone has argued that moral arguments such as intentional 
deception should be treated differently than economic concerns. Robert G. Bone, Taking the 
Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark 
Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1350–53 (2012). Others have argued that additional 
values, such as the First Amendment, should play a larger role in the development of trademark 
jurisprudence. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 
SMU L. REV. 381, 447–57 (2008) (arguing that trademark law should be subject to more First 
Amendment scrutiny); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 
S.C. L. REV. 737, 756 (2007) (noting that while she is “largely in favor of core trademark 
infringement doctrine as it stands now,” she nevertheless believes that trademark law should be 
treated more consistently with other commercial speech for First Amendment purposes).  
 22.  See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64. 
 23. See supra note 21. 
24. Registration-based trademark systems are more common than use-based systems. See, 
e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name 
System, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 496 (2000) (“[F]or over a century the United States has 
steadfastly resisted adoption of a registration-based system of trademark priority and has adhered 
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exclusive rights associated with a mark that otherwise qualifies for 
protection originate from the use of the mark in commerce, not its 
federal registration.25 Federal registration of a mark with the 
Trademark Office is not required for a trademark to become protected. 
Moreover, the Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark law, fails 
to protect a trademark registrant’s exclusive rights in its mark once the 
mark is no longer being used in commerce and there is no intent to 
resume such use.26 
Nevertheless, even in the American use-based system, federal 
registration of a mark confers a number of important legal rights and 
benefits on the registering party that substantially enhances the rights 
of trademark owners established by mere common law use.27 For one, 
registration provides the trademark registrant with a “right of priority, 
nationwide in effect,” against anyone else in the nation who uses the 
registered mark after the date of application.28 This right of priority 
extends nationally even if the registrant has not itself used the mark 
throughout the nation. In contrast, exclusive rights in an unregistered 
instead to a use-based philosophy.”). Although trademarks are governed by both state and federal 
law, the Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark law, dominates. See, e.g., The United States 
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA 
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987) (“Federal trademark 
registration, Section 43(a), and the engulfing sweep of interstate commerce have given the law 
and policy of trademarks a strongly federal cast. The federal courts now decide, under federal 
law, all but a few trademark disputes. State trademark law and state courts are less influential 
than ever.”); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 604–05 (2011) (summarizing the dominance of federal law in the shaping 
of trademark rights). For a persuasive argument that state law has played less of a role in the 
development of trademark law than generally believed, see generally Mark P. McKenna, 
Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288, 
288 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015). 
25. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“At common law the exclusive right to [a 
trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, 
Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough 
to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership 
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”). 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2018) (requiring an applicant to submit a statement that the mark 
is being used in commerce); id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . . its use 
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.”). 
27. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015) (“The Lanham Act 
confers ‘important legal rights and benefits’ on trademark owners who register their marks.” 
(quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 19:3, at 19–21 (4th ed. 2014))); see Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 
IOWA L. REV. 1977, 1985 (2019) [hereinafter Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function] (“And 
despite the dearth of discussion about it, registration matters.”).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). 
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mark extend only to the geographic regions in which the mark is being 
used.29 
Additionally, once a mark has been registered for five years, it can 
become “incontestable,” which limits the grounds upon which the 
mark’s validity may be challenged.30 This advantage is especially 
significant for “descriptive” marks, or marks that “immediately 
convey[] information concerning a quality or characteristic of the 
product or service.”31 Marks that are descriptive must show “secondary 
meaning” as a designation of source for that product; that is, they must 
demonstrate that consumers do not think of the mark as merely 
describing the product but instead identify the mark with the product 
to receive trademark protection in the United States.32 Incontestability 
prevents courts from revisiting whether a mark is descriptive, even 
when the evidence suggests the mark never developed a secondary 
meaning.33 
Another substantive advantage that flows from registration is the 
ability to obtain the assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) in restricting the importation of infringing or counterfeit 
goods.34 After a markholder applies to record its registered mark with 
the CBP, CBP officers access the recording data to prevent the 
importation of goods bearing the infringing marks.35 This protection 
substantially enhances a markholder’s ability to block infringing 
merchandise from entering the country in the first place. 
Registration also furnishes a number of procedural advantages. 
For instance, registration provides prima facie evidence of the validity 
of the mark, the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and the registrant’s 
exclusive right to use the mark in U.S. commerce in connection with 
 29. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he owner of common-law trademark rights in an unregistered mark is not entitled to 
injunctive relief in those localities where it has failed to establish actual use of the mark.”).  
 30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b). 
 31. In re MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 32. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995). 
 33. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“We conclude that Park ’N Fly’s mark used in the context of airport parking is, at best, a merely 
descriptive mark . . . . [It] would not be entitled to continued registration but for its incontestable 
status . . . .”), rev’d, 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124; 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2018). 
 35. Help CBP Protect Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION 
(July 19, 2019), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/ipr/protection [https://perma.cc/7MG7-
J9C2]. 
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the goods and services listed in the certificate.36 Federal registration 
also enables a markholder to sue in federal court to enforce her 
trademark.37 Finally, registration enhances damages, as only registered 
marks can take advantage of counterfeiting provisions that award 
automatic treble damages upon a showing of intentional and knowing 
use of a counterfeit mark.38 Taken together, these benefits are so 
significant that it is now commonplace for owners seeking protection 
of trademark rights to file for federal registration rather than rely solely 
on the use-based system.39 
B. The Registration Process 
To obtain federal registration of a trademark on the principal 
register, the mark’s owner must file an application with the Trademark 
Office, which is an agency housed in the Department of Commerce.40 
The application must include, among other things, a depiction of the 
mark and a list of the goods or services for which protection is sought.41 
The applicant must also specify the statutory “basis” for its application, 
of which the two most common are current use of the mark in 
commerce and a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.42 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
 37. Id. § 1121. 
 38. Id. § 1117(b). A court can decline to award treble damages when it finds extenuating 
circumstances. Id.
39. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011) (“[F]ederal registration [is] indispensable for any owner making an 
informed decision about its trademark rights.”). In addition, some scholars have argued that 
registration also can enable owners to assert more tenuous claims—that is, bully—competitors 
and new entrants who lack the financial resources to litigate. See, e.g., Roberts, Trademark Failure 
to Function, supra note 27, at 1985.
40. The Lanham Act establishes two separate registers, principal and supplemental, for 
federal trademark registrations. Trademarks and service marks that identify the goods or services 
of one manufacturer and distinguish them from another—that is, are distinctive—are eligible for 
registration on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; see also id. §§ 1051–72. In contrast, 
designations that do not perform this function but are instead merely descriptive, deceptively 
misdescriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, or product configurations that lack acquired 
distinctiveness, among other things, may be registered on the supplemental register. Id. § 1091(a). 
The principal-register registrations enjoy a number of substantive and procedural advantages that 
do not accrue to the supplemental-register registrations. 
41. 37 C.F.R.§ 2.21(a) (2019) (listing the basic requirements of an application to obtain a 
filing date as (a) the legal name of the applicant; (b) a name and address for correspondence; (c) 
a depiction of the mark; (d) a list of the goods and services for which protection is sought; and (e) 
the filing fee for at least one class of goods and services). 
42. Although the intent-to-use applications are relatively new, originating in 1989, they 
comprise, on average, the majority of new filings at the Trademark Office each year. Graham et 
al., supra note 10, at 15–16.
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Upon receipt of the application, the Trademark Office randomly 
assigns the application to a trademark-examining attorney.43 The 
attorney then conducts an ex parte examination to determine whether 
the mark meets the federal registration requirements. These 
requirements incorporate the basic doctrinal principles that govern the 
validity of a trademark, including conditions that the mark must 
possess either inherent or acquired distinctiveness of source, not be 
confusingly similar to some previously used or registered mark, and not 
be deceptive without secondary meaning.44 If the trademark-examining 
attorney finds grounds for refusing registration, she will issue an “office 
action” informing the applicant of the reasons why the registration is 
denied.45 The applicant can then argue the examiner is incorrect or 
amend the application to attempt to moot the grounds for refusal.46 
This process may occur several times until the examiner either 
approves the application for publication in the Trademark Office’s 
Official Gazette or finally refuses to register the mark. An aggrieved 
applicant can appeal the denial of registration to the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), an administrative tribunal within the 
Trademark Office composed primarily of administrative trademark 
judges.47 
If the trademark-examining attorney determines that the mark 
appears registrable, the Trademark Office will publish the application 
in the Trademark Office’s Official Gazette for opposition. The thirty-
day opposition period is the first opportunity for a third party to 
challenge the validity of the registration by initiating an administrative 
“opposition” proceeding before the TTAB.48 The opposition 
 43. Id. at 18. Prior to November 3, 2002, applications were assigned to one of seventeen law 
offices in the Trademark Office based on the goods and services claimed in the application. The 
applications, however, were still randomly assigned to a trademark-examining attorney within the 
law office of interest. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)–(f). 
45. 37 C.F.R. § 2.21(5)(b). 
 46. Id. § 2.63(a). 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1070. Technically, the TTAB is composed of at least three of the Director, 
Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Commissioner for 
Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative trademark judges who are 
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Director. Id. § 1067(b). The 
process by which the Board reviews trademark denials is more formal than the process by which 
the Trademark Office makes the initial registration decisions. However, the process by which the 
Board reviews trademark denials does not rise to the level of APA required formal adjudication. 
See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1524. 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). Oppositions must be filed within thirty days of the publication of the 
trademark. Id.
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proceedings before the TTAB are more formal than both the initial 
registration decision by the trademark-examining attorney and 
trademark-denial proceedings in that the opposition proceedings are 
designed to roughly approximate civil actions in federal court.49 If no 
oppositions are filed or the applicant successfully overcomes an 
opposition, the use-based applications proceed directly to registration. 
With respect to intent-to-use applications, the Trademark Office will 
issue a notice of allowance, which states that the applicant must file a 
satisfactory statement of use of the mark before the Trademark Office 
will register the mark.50 
Finally, after the opposition period has expired and the Agency 
has issued the registration, a third party may still attack the trademark 
grant by initiating an administrative proceeding before the TTAB to 
cancel the registration.51 For five years after the initial grant of 
registration, the grounds for canceling a mark are the same as opposing 
a mark. A third party may oppose the registration of a mark for any 
substantive ground a trademark-examining attorney must consider 
when making the initial registration decision, plus two additional 
substantive grounds: dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring.52 
After this five-year period, the substantive grounds upon which a third 
party can cancel a registration narrow considerably, rendering the 
mark “incontestable.”53 
Aggrieved parties can appeal adjudications of trademark-
registration grants or denials by the TTAB to the Federal Circuit on 
the record generated in Trademark Office proceedings or challenge the 
TTAB’s decision in a civil action in federal district court, where 
additional discovery may be taken and new evidence submitted.54 Once 
49. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 143 (2015) (describing “[o]pposition 
proceedings before the TTAB” as “similar to a civil action in a federal district court” (quoting 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL 
BOARD  MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 102.03 (2014))). See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1525 
(discussing the formality associated with TTAB opposition proceedings). 
50. 37 C.F.R. § 2.81(b). The applicant has six months from the date of notice of allowance to 
file a statement of use, although this period can be extended to up to thirty months for good cause. 
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
52. See id. §§ 1064(1)–(3), 1065, 1067–68. 
 53. Id. § 1065. For more background on incontestability in trademark law, see generally 
Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier?, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 434 
(2017). 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1071. The appeal to the Federal Circuit is limited to the issues raised and the 
record established before the Board. Id. § 1071(a)(4). The appeal to the district court is by way of 
civil action and is a de novo proceeding. Id. § 1071(b)(1).
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a party appeals a TTAB decision to a federal district court, the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction is divested.55 Subsequent appeals of district court 
decisions are to be taken to the regional circuits.56 
C. Concerns with Heterogeneity in Decision-Making 
The Trademark Office employs approximately seven hundred 
trademark-examining attorneys who make over half a million 
trademark-registration determinations each year.57 However, several 
of the requirements for federal registration, which parallel the validity 
doctrines of trademarks,58 contain broad or vague standards. Like 
many agencies, the Trademark Office seeks to cabin the discretion of 
trademark-examining attorneys by promulgating manuals that provide 
detailed rules on how trademark examination should proceed.59 But 
these guidelines are a constant struggle between generality and 
precision, granting trademark-examining attorneys ample latitude to 
determine whether a trademark meets the federal registration 
requirements. 
For example, trademark-examining attorneys reject trademark 
registrations most frequently when there is a likelihood that the mark 
is confusingly similar to another mark.60 This doctrine involves a 
 55. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Deference to United States Patent and Trademark Office 
Determinations by Federal District Courts and the Regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, 87 
TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1997); Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How 
Much Deference Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
Decisions?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 489 (2003). 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1121; see also Williams v. Dep’t of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1490 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). Despite having two different routes to appeal TTAB decisions, aggrieved parties 
historically have overwhelmingly favored appeal to the Federal Circuit over pursuing civil action.
See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1526.
 57. 2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 & tbl.15 
(noting that in the fiscal year of 2019 the Trademark Office employed 701 trademark-examining 
attorneys and processed more than 670,000 trademark applications). 
 58. Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1520 (“The Trademark Office may reject a registration on 
any number of procedural and substantive grounds, the latter of which incorporate the basic 
doctrinal principles that govern the validity of a trademark.”).
 59.  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE (2018), https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current [https://perma.cc/YNL3-
LRZE].
 60. Graham et al., supra note 10, at 18 (“The most common ground for refusing registration 
is the existence of a ‘likelihood of confusion’ between the applicant’s mark and the mark in an 
existing registration.”). The Trademark Act states that a mark cannot be registered if it “so 
resembles [an existing] mark . . . as to be likely . . . to cause confusion . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). 
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thirteen-factor test61 that has been described by Professor Bob Bone as 
“deeply flawed . . . open-ended and relatively subjective.”62 Although 
Trademark Office guidance dictates that two of the thirteen factors 
carry the most weight, the Trademark Office also states “there is no 
mechanical test for determining likelihood of confusion and ‘each case 
must be decided on its own facts.’”63 Given this broad, case-by-case 
decision-making process, it seems highly probable that there is 
significant heterogeneity in trademark examiners’ determinations. 
To our knowledge, the only study to date that empirically 
examines the heterogeneity of trademark-examining attorneys’ 
determinations is the work of Professors Robert Barton Beebe and 
Jeanne C. Fromer.64 Their important study examined 1,901 marks that 
the Agency had refused to register on the basis of the prohibition on 
scandalous or immoral marks.65 They found that in 114 cases the 
Agency “stated that the mark was immoral or scandalous and thus 
 61. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973), established a 
thirteen-factor test for determining the likelihood of confusion: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, 
sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an 
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels. 
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. 
careful, sophisticated purchasing. 
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent 
use without evidence of actual confusion. 
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family’ mark, 
product mark). 
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark. . . . 
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on 
its goods. 
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial. 
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use. 
Id. at 1361. 
 62. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a 
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012). 
 63. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1207.01 LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (2018), https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/ 
TMEP/current [https://perma.cc/P6QK-S7ZT] (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 
F.2d at 1361). 
 64. See generally Beebe & Fromer, supra note 17 (discussing the ways the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office has applied the immoral or scandalous prohibition). 
 65. Id. at 171–72. 
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could not be registered—and that the [Agency] had already registered 
a highly similar mark on highly similar goods or services.”66 One of 
these cases included the Trademark Office’s refusal to register the 
mark FUK!T in connection with apparel on the basis that the applied-
for mark was immoral or scandalous and confusingly similar to the 
recently registered—and seemingly equally scandalous—apparel mark 
PHUKIT.67 This led Professors Beebe and Fromer to conclude that 
Trademark Office is, by its own admission, “making a large number of 
inconsistent applications of the § 2(a) prohibition on the registration of 
immoral-or-scandalous marks—and often just a short time apart.”68 
A Trademark Office that treats similar applications in dissimilar 
ways is problematic for several reasons. To begin, the existence of 
interexaminer disparity itself demonstrates how much discretionary 
authority trademark-examining attorneys wield and instills little 
confidence that they are exercising this discretion to apply trademark-
registration standards in a guided and regimented manner. In other 
words, inconsistent behavior across examiners leaves observers 
wondering whether examiners are systematically “missing the mark” 
in making registration determinations. 
The trademark-registration standards are set to generally parallel 
the economic justifications for trademarks—that is, enabling the public 
to easily identify a particular product from a specific source without 
unduly restricting orderly competition.69 As a result, if trademark-
examining attorneys are routinely denying registrations on valid 
trademarks, then the Trademark Office would be depriving those 
applications that may be the most worthy of the substantial rights 
associated with federal registration. If firms are allowed to free ride off 
the goodwill of other firms, then trademark owners’ incentives to 
preserve and improve product quality may be diminished. 
Alternatively, if trademark-examining attorneys are allowing 
invalid trademarks to be registered, these trademarks may impose the 
costs of additional federal registration rights on society without 
producing any of the associated benefits. Moreover, once a mark has 
been registered for five years it can become incontestable, limiting the 
grounds on which a court can invalidate the mark during infringement 
 66.  Id. at 183, 188. 
 67. Id. at 183. 
 68. Id.
69. See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1520–23.
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litigation.70 Thus, the Trademark Office registration decisions not only 
impact whether federal rights can be obtained but also can affect 
whether a mark is held valid in a trademark-infringement lawsuit.71 
Beyond concerns regarding the quality of examination, 
interexaminer disparity may erode confidence in the Trademark Office 
by creating the appearance of unfairness and arbitrariness.72 
Inconsistent trademark-registration decisions also offend theories of 
administrative justice while raising questions of equity.73 Simply put, 
the likelihood that a mark is granted federal registration should not be 
a function of which trademark-examining attorney the application is 
randomly assigned to; instead registration should hinge on the merits 
of the application. 
Despite the concerns with interexaminer disparity, empirical 
examination of the trademark system—especially the administrative 
process by which federal trademark registrations are obtained—is 
exceedingly rare.74 As noted above, the work of Professors Beebe and 
Fromer is one of the few, if only, studies that has examined 
heterogeneity in trademark-examining-attorney decision-making. 
Although their work is an important contribution to the literature, they 
focused on only one basis of refusal—scandalous or immoral 
prohibition—and as a result examined less than 1 percent of 
trademark-registration determinations.75 Moreover, by focusing on 
refusals, their analysis only concentrated on inconsistency in one 
particular category of Trademark Office outcomes and decisions. This 
Article begins to fill this gap in the literature and provides a more 
complete sense of the degree of inconsistency in decision-making at the 
Trademark Office by using data from over 7.8 million trademark 
applications and conducting the first large-scale, systematic 
investigation of a range of decisions made by—and outcomes reached 
by—trademark-examining attorneys. 
70. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, supra note 27, at 1985.
 72. See MASHAW, supra note 15, at 73. 
 73. Id. at 25–26; see also Kagan, supra note 15, at 820 (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, 
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) and 
detailing how his “bureaucratic rationality” is a model of agency adjudication that facilitates 
“[g]reater control and consistency” by placing “the overriding value” on “accurate, efficient and 
consistent implementation of centrally-formulated policies”).  
74. Graham et al., supra note 10, at 3. 
75. Professors Beebe and Fromer note that only 1,901 marks out of 3.6 million registrations 
were refused on the grounds of scandalous or immoral prohibition. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 
17, at 171–72. 
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data and Outcomes 
To demonstrate and evaluate the degree of heterogeneity in 
behavior across trademark-examining attorneys, we collected rich data 
on individual trademark applications from 1982 to the present from the 
Trademark Case Files Dataset made available by the Trademark 
Office’s Office of the Chief Economist.76 These data provide 
information on (1) the name of the examining attorney randomly 
assigned to the application; (2) a range of characteristics of these 
applications—for example, whether the application is an intent-to-use 
application; whether the application is a trademark, service mark, 
collective mark, etc.;77 and (3) various outcomes associated with the 
application—for example whether the application was published, 
whether an opposition to the publication was sustained, etc.78 Over this 
sample period, these data provide information on the reviews of 1,308 
trademark-examining attorneys, who, on average, review over 6,000 
applications over their careers. In total, our database comprises over 
7.8 million trademark applications. 
Using these data, our key empirical exercise is to observe how 
certain Trademark Office outcomes vary across the different 
examining attorneys to which the applications are randomly assigned. 
As such, we have analyzed the reviews completed by the different 
examiners at the office and documented variation in the following 
outcomes: 
1. The likelihood that the application is published;
76. A description of this dataset is provided by Stuart Graham, Galen Hancock, Alan Marco, 
and Amanda Myers. Graham et al., supra note 10. Though some data on applications from years 
prior to 1982 are made available with this dataset, we focus on data in the post-1982 era given the 
data prior to this period does not contain all abandoned applications. Id. at 32. 
77. Below, we provide a more complete list of the application characteristics that we utilize 
in our empirical analysis. A certification mark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, 
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s good or services or that the work or 
labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). A service mark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . to identify and distinguish the services of one person . . . from the services of others 
and to indicate the source of the services . . . .” Id.
78. Again, for a more complete listing and discussion of the various application outcomes 
that we investigate, see infra pp. 1824–26. 
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2. The likelihood that the application is published on the first 
substantive evaluation—that is, without an office action having 
set forth an initial basis for denial of the application;
3. The likelihood that an opposition to the application was 
sustained by the TTAB; 
4. The likelihood that the application was ultimately registered; 
and 
5. The duration of the application at the Trademark Office up 
until the point in time of the publication decision. 
B. Methodology: Summary Statistics on Spread in Outcomes Across 
Examining Attorneys 
These five measures reflect outcomes of substantial import not 
just to the applicants but to the members of society whose interests the 
trademark system seeks to protect. In the case of each of these separate 
outcomes, we begin this empirical exercise by offering simple summary 
statistics describing the degree of variation in the relevant outcomes 
across examining attorneys. As a baseline frame of reference, we 
illustrate the mean of the relevant outcome across examiners, allowing 
us to observe a central point around which we evaluate the degree of 
examining-attorney heterogeneity. We then present the standard 
deviation of the relevant outcome across the examining attorneys.79 
Though slightly different from the “average absolute deviation” in its 
precise formulation, the standard deviation tends to demonstrate the 
degree to which a typical observation of the measure in question 
deviates from the average value of that measure.80 Accordingly, if the 
79. Importantly, when constructing these statistics and when graphically presenting the 
frequency distributions of the relevant outcomes across examining attorneys, see infra Parts II.C 
and II.D, we do not weigh each examiner’s relevant rate by the number of reviews that she has 
completed over her lifetime. That is, in constructing the mean publication rate across examiners, 
we are assigning equal weight in creating this mean to examiners who have reviewed 5,000 
applications as we are to examiners who have reviewed 7,000 applications. Nonetheless, for every 
empirical exercise reported in this Article, we have produced a corresponding set of results in 
which we have weighted all analyses by the examiners’ lifetime review count. The conclusions 
that we reach from this analysis regarding examining-attorney heterogeneity are not at all 
sensitive to this weighting choice (the full set of results is available upon demand from the 
authors). 
80. Deviation measures are generally used to provide an average sense of how much 
observations in a dataset deviate from the mean of the relevant measure within the data. An 
immediate problem arises when considering that some observations will deviate in a negative 
sense and some will deviate in a positive sense. Simply averaging over those positive and negative 
deviations will thus mask true variations around the mean. The “standard deviation” measure 
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value of the standard deviation is of a magnitude that represents a 
meaningful distance from the mean, there are likely to be many 
observations in the dataset that differ from one another to an 
economically meaningful degree. 
It is difficult to compare standard deviations across measures, 
however. That is, it is arguably inappropriate to compare the standard 
deviation of one measure (for example, the examining-attorney 
publication rate) with the standard deviation of another measure (the 
examining-attorney registration rate) if one’s goal is to assess whether 
the degree of spread in the first measure is greater than or less than the 
degree of spread in the second measure. For instance, one would think 
there is much more spread in the data when we see a standard deviation 
of 1 in a variable that has a mean of 2 than when we see a standard 
deviation of 1 when looking at a variable with a mean of 100. 
Accordingly, to derive a generic measure of the spread of a variable, 
we next present a summary statistic that takes this point into 
consideration and that scales the standard deviation in question by its 
associated mean. This statistic goes by the name of the Coefficient of 
Variation (“COV”). By normalizing the standard deviation in this 
manner, this statistic offers a way of comparing the degree of spread 
across outcomes with different means—that is, it will aid us in 
comparing the magnitude of the spread in publication rates to the 
magnitude of the spread in registration rates even if the mean 
registration rate is notably lower than the mean publication rate. 
We acknowledge, however, that reporting the COV alone does 
not necessarily answer the question of whether, in an absolute sense, 
there is a “large” degree of variation in the relevant measure. That 
assessment perhaps remains a judgment call for the consumer of this 
information depending on her priors regarding an acceptable amount 
of variation. Nonetheless, in the case of the statistics reported below, 
we argue that it would be reasonable to conclude from this analysis and 
the degree of variation depicted that substantial administrative justice 
and social welfare concerns arise in this Trademark Office context. 
attempts to resolve this dilemma by squaring the deviation between each observation’s value and 
the mean value across the sample, and thereafter: (1) taking the average of those squared 
deviations over all observations and (2) taking the square root of this average-of-squared-
deviations value to place the deviation measure back in the same units as the measure of interest. 
Note that, when dealing with samples, the standard deviation divides by N-1 (instead of N) in 
calculating the average squared deviation (where N equals the number of observations in the 
sample). See generally HOWELL JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW, STEVEN SHAVELL, W. KIP VISCUSI
& DAVID COPE, ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 2017).
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C. Methodology: Graphical Analysis 
Perhaps the best way for us to demonstrate the full degree of 
variation in these Trademark Office outcomes—and to allow the 
reader to reach her own conclusions regarding the size of this 
variation—is to move beyond a presentation of simple numerical 
summary statistics and to visually depict the full distribution of the 
relevant outcomes that we observe across the examining attorneys in 
our dataset. Accordingly, we plot a frequency distribution for each 
relevant measure. The x-axis of these graphs will reflect the different 
possible values of the outcome in question—for instance, different 
rates of trademark-application publication across examining 
attorneys—and the y-axis reflects the frequency by which we observe 
the respective measure across examining attorneys at each of the 
relevant x-axis values. With this visualization, one can readily ascertain 
the share of observed values of the outcome in question that tend to 
cluster around its central tendency—such as its mean—along with the 
share of these observations that extend sufficiently far from this central 
point. Knowing these shares may provide a trademark applicant with a 
sense of their likelihood that they may receive an outlying 
determination by their assigned examiner. 
Of course, one may be concerned that some degree of this 
heterogeneity may not necessarily reflect true differences in how 
trademark-examining attorneys actually practice but may instead 
mirror variations in the characteristics of the applications assigned to 
those examining attorneys. For instance, perhaps some examining 
attorneys tend to get a higher concentration of intent-to-use 
applications, which may tend to be published and registered at 
different rates than use-based applications for reasons unrelated to the 
underlying tendencies of the examining attorneys. This differential 
assignment could explain some level of the variation across examining-
attorney publication and registration rates. We could raise similar 
concerns with respect to a range of other application characteristics. 
To begin, mediating against the concern that applications of 
different characteristics may be clustered in the hands of certain 
examining attorneys is the random assignment of applications to 
examining attorneys in the first place. 
Nonetheless, to further account for any residual concerns that 
these frequency distributions reflect differences in application 
characteristics across the applications that examining attorneys review, 
we also present corresponding frequency-distribution graphs where we 
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have first adjusted each examining attorney’s rate of the respective 
measure for the full set of application characteristics associated with 
their reviews. In other words, we attempt to depict heterogeneity in the 
examining attorney’s inherent rate of publication, inherent rate of 
registration, etc., where these inherent rates have canceled out the 
influence of the particular distribution of application characteristics 
that the examining attorney happened to have confronted. For 
instance, if an examining attorney, by happenstance, is assigned a 
higher proportion of applications for trademarks associated with 
pharmaceuticals and if applications in that industry just happen to be 
published at higher rates relative to applications in other industries, 
then our approach appropriately scales down the examining attorney’s 
observed rate of publication. Specifically, to execute this approach, we 
consider the sample of individual applications and regress the relevant 
outcome measure—such as the incidence of publication—on the full 
set of application characteristics that we wish to account for, along with 
a full set of dichotomous variables representing each individual 
examining attorney (that is, a full set of examining-attorney “fixed 
effects”). We then use these estimated examiner fixed effects to 
characterize the examining attorneys’ inherent rates of the respective 
measure, a rate that partials out the influence of those other 
characteristics controlled for in this regression. 
For the purposes of this latter adjustment exercise, we adjust for 
the following application characteristics: indicator variables for the 
various years in which the applications were filed; indicator variables 
for the type of mark, including trademark, service mark, collective 
trademark, collective membership mark, or collective service mark; 
indicator variables for the legal basis of the filing, such as whether it is 
use-based, intent-to-use, foreign priority/pending, foreign 
priority/published, or international registration; indicator variables for 
whether the application is for a standard character mark, a mark with 
stylized text, a design with or without text, or a mark for which no 
drawing is possible; and indicator variables for each of the forty-five 
different industry classifications, such as chemicals, clothing, etc. As we 
demonstrate below, with the exception of the duration analysis, the 
spread associated with the depicted frequency distributions does not 
appear to be affected by this adjustment procedure. Accordingly, it 
does indeed appear that random assignment of applications to 
examining attorneys, combined with a large number of career reviews 
for each examining attorney, goes a long way toward alleviating 
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concerns over the influence of application characteristics on the 
heterogeneity of raw rates of the observed measures. 
D. Methodology: Statistical Inference 
On a final methodological point, we acknowledge that one would 
expect to observe some degree of heterogeneity in observed rates of 
these various outcomes across trademark-examining attorneys just by 
chance alone. Essentially, it may be correct, hypothetically, that the 
true fundamental rate by which all examining attorneys publish 
applications is 78 percent, in which case if examining attorneys were, 
hypothetically, to review an infinite number of applications, we would 
observe an average publication rate of 78 percent for each of them. 
However, even if this is their fundamental tendency, we may not 
observe a precise 78 percent rate for each examining attorney if we 
only observe a finite number of reviews for each examiner. Due to 
sampling error, we will likely observe some degree of spread in each of 
the relevant outcomes across examiners. One of our key empirical 
exercises is thus to test whether the degree of variation that we actually 
observe is larger than one would expect from chance alone. We 
approach this exercise in statistical inference from two perspectives. 
First, for each of the outcome measures explored, we formally test 
the null hypothesis that the rate of the relevant outcome is the same 
across trademark-examining attorneys. For these purposes, we 
consider the set of trademark applications and regress the relevant 
outcome variable—for instance, the incidence of the application being 
published—on a full set of fixed effects for each trademark-examining 
attorney. We then perform an F-test of the hypothesis that each of the 
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects are identical to one 
another. We present the resulting F-statistic along with its 
corresponding p-value, which indicates the likelihood that one would 
observe the reported F-statistic if in fact the null hypothesis—that is, 
equal-examiner effects—were true. If this p-value is less than 0.05, then 
we can indeed reject this null hypothesis at the conventional level of 
statistical confidence. 
Next, we take a more graphical approach to this inference 
exercise. To demonstrate this approach, consider our publication-rate 
analysis and bear in mind that the average publication rate across the 
sample is 78 percent. For each application, we generate a random 
variable drawn from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—that is, a random 
number that falls continuously between 0 and 1. With this random 
draw, we generate for each application a placebo variable for whether 
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or not the application was published, where this placebo equals 1— 
indicating a placebo publication—if the random draw is less than 0.78 
and equals 0 if the random draw is greater than 0.78. In this light, the 
average rate of this placebo-publication indicator over the sample 
equals the actual publication rate. Whether or not the application is 
registered as a placebo publication, of course, is randomly determined. 
In this light, the fundamental likelihood that we will observe a placebo 
publication does not differ across examining attorneys—reflective of 
our null hypothesis. 
With this placebo assignment, we then calculate the rate of 
placebo publications for each examining attorney in the sample and 
thereafter plot a frequency distribution of these placebo-publication 
rates across examiners. Naturally, we will observe some variation here, 
but that variation is not a reflection of differences in inherent 
publication tendencies. Instead, this placebo variation reflects mere 
chance—or the likelihood that examining attorney X’s publication rate 
falls above or below 78 percent because we have yet to observe enough 
applications reviewed by examining attorney X to reach a convergence 
around the true mean of 78 percent. Ultimately, to the extent that the 
spread depicted in the frequency distribution for actual publication 
rates exceeds that of the placebo-publication rates, this differential is 
likely to reflect actual heterogeneity in examining-attorney behavior, 
especially once adjusting for application characteristics. Although this 
explanation has focused on publication rates, we perform this placebo 
analysis for each of the investigated outcome variables.
Ultimately, with over 7.8 million applications in our sample and 
with each examining attorney reviewing over 6,000 applications over 
their careers in our sample, there is very little room in the first place 
for chance alone to explain the degree of variations in outcomes across 
examining attorneys that we depict in our figures. As such, we note that 
there is arguably little controversy in this Article’s refutation of the 
baseline null hypothesis that examining attorneys all make decisions in 
the same manner. The bigger challenge for this Article is one that we 
already raised above and with respect to which formal statistical tests 
are arguably unavailable—namely, whether the magnitude of the 
variation that we do depict is large enough to truly invoke policy 
concerns. Lacking a methodological basis of assessing this arguably 
subjective question, our primary methodological approach here is to 
be as transparent as possible in depicting the degree of variation across 
examining attorneys, allowing the readers to reach their own 
assessments of whether this heterogeneity poses concerns over 
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inefficiencies and inequities at the Trademark Office. Nonetheless, we 
do offer for the reader our own assessments regarding the breadth of 
variation observed and argue that it does implicate concerns of this 
nature that merit further attention by the academy and by 
policymakers. 
III. RESULTS
This Part presents the results from our empirical analysis, 
implementing the approaches just laid out in Part II. More specifically, 
this Part provides evidence that trademark-examining attorneys have 
substantially divergent overall publication rates, publication rates on 
the first substantive Trademark Office action—which we use to proxy 
the scope of protection allowed—and registration rates. We also find 
evidence that whether a filed opposition is sustained varies 
considerably among trademark-examining attorneys as does the 
duration of time an application is before the Trademark Office. 
A. Publication-Rate Analysis 
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting evidence bearing 
on heterogeneity across trademark-examining attorneys in the rates by 
which they decide to publish the applications that they are reviewing. 
To be clear, by rates, we are referring to the percentage of applications 
reviewed by trademark-examining attorneys that they decide to 
publish. As reported in Table 1, the mean publication rate across all 
examining trademark attorneys, practicing since 1982, is 78 percent. 
The standard deviation around this mean is 11.5 percent. This alone 
suggests a meaningful degree of variation in publication decisions 
across examiners, with a typical examiner’s publication rate tending to 
swing from roughly 67 to 89 percent—that is, 1 standard deviation 
above and below the mean. Considering that an applicant is randomly 
assigned to an examiner, this “standard” spread suggests an arguably 
meaningful degree of inequity in this important Trademark Office 
outcome, while likewise suggesting some meaningful degree of 
inefficiency in the evaluation process. As discussed below when 
presenting the full distribution, the spread between the highest-rate 
and lowest-rate examining attorneys is even greater. 
In Table 2, we show the resulting mean and standard deviation of 
the estimated examining-attorney fixed effects, which provide us with 
a sense of how examining attorneys’ inherent publication rates differ 
from one another while accounting for differences across examining 
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attorneys in the composition of the applications that they review—for 
example, accounting for differences in the mix of industries that their 
reviews cover. With this adjustment process, the mean of this estimated 
fixed-effect variable does not correspond with the mean overall 
publication rate; rather, the mean fixed effects are centered roughly 
around 0, with a positive fixed-effect value indicating that the relevant 
examiner has above-average publication tendencies and a negative 
value indicating below-average tendencies. Nonetheless, the standard 
deviation of these estimated fixed effects continues to provide us with 
a sense of the standard swing in publication rates across examining 
attorneys. We find a standard deviation in estimated examining-
attorney fixed effects of 11.2 percent. As demonstrated, this degree of 
swing is roughly the same as we find when looking at the standard 
deviation of unadjusted examining-attorney publication rates. In other 
words, the degree of variation in publication rates across examining 
attorneys described above cannot be explained by differences in the 
types of applications reviewed by those examining attorneys. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the large number of applications that they 
review and given that applications are randomly assigned—that is, not 
assigned to examining attorneys based on application characteristics.81 
In the final row of Table 1, we formally test the null hypothesis 
that the publication rate across examiners is in fact the same and that 
these observed swings are merely due to sampling error. As the 
reported F-statistic and associated p-value demonstrate, we can reject 
this null hypothesis at a very high degree of confidence, meaning 
greater than 99 percent. As such, we can infer that there are true 
variations in publication rates across examining attorneys. 
In Figure 1, we present a frequency distribution of the observed 
publication rates across all trademark-examining attorneys from 1982 
81. Note that we are comparing the degree of spread in the raw publication rates with the 
degree of spread in the application-characteristic-adjusted publication rates by comparing the 
standard deviations of these two measures, as distinct from comparing their COV. While 
comparing spreads by comparing standard deviations is arguably inappropriate when comparing 
the spreads of two separate variables, see supra Part II.B, comparing the standard deviations is 
arguably appropriate here as we are comparing the degree of spread in the same inherent variable 
(with the same units of measurement, etc.). The risk-adjustment approach is designed such that 
the mean of the raw publication rate is the same as the mean of the predicted risk-adjusted 
publication rate. When graphically depicting how this risk-adjusted publication rate varies across 
examiners, we have simply recentered the mean of this distribution around 0 (since this is what is 
produced through the regression-based process for risk adjustment discussed above), but this 
mean recentering does not change the interpretation of the degree of spread around this mean. 
In other words, shifting a distribution from side to side does not alter one’s assessment of the 
degree of breadth of that distribution. 
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to the present.82 This figure allows us to visualize the degree of spread 
suggested by the above summary statistics while also allowing us to 
observe the more extreme degree of this spread—that is, to observe 
the publication rates of examining attorneys whose rates exceed 1 
standard deviation away from the mean. As is evident from the figure, 
a small but meaningful number of examining attorneys have 
publication rates at roughly 60 percent and below and a small but 
meaningful number of examining attorneys publish applications nearly 
100 percent of the time. To provide more specifics on this observation 
about the tails of the distribution of publication rates across examining 
attorneys, the publication rate at the 2nd percentile is roughly 56 
percent, whereas the publication rate at the 98th percentile is 100 
percent. This suggests that at least 2 percent of trademark-examining 
attorneys publish less than 56 percent of the applications that they 
review, while at least 2 percent of trademark-examining attorneys 
publish all of the applications that they review. In other words, if we 
took fifty applicants at random, one of those applicants would draw an 
examining attorney that would give them a less than 56 percent chance 
of success, whereas another one of those applicants would draw an 
examining attorney that would almost guarantee them success with the 
publication stage of the process. 
In Figure 2, we present the corresponding distribution of placebo-
publication rates, where we randomly assign placebo-publication 
outcomes to each application such that we hit the same mean 
publication rate overall and where variation across examiners can only 
derive from chance and limited sample sizes. As is clear from a 
comparison between Figures 1 and 2, the degree of variation in 
publication rates actually observed is notably greater than what one 
expects from chance alone.83 
Finally, in Figure 3, we present the frequency distribution of 
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects. Though now centered 
around 0 as a frame of reference—by design—these estimates of 
82. Again, we do not weight each examining attorney’s rate by the number of reviews that 
she completes over her career, though we note that the corresponding weighted distribution looks 
substantially similar to the unweighted figure, with the exception of dampening the masses at 0 
and 1 when weighting these rates by the denominator. 
83. As a rationality check on this placebo approach, we conducted an F-test on the null 
hypothesis that each of the placebo-examining-attorney publication rates were the same. With an 
F-statistic of 0.999 and a corresponding p-value of 0.500, we could not reject this null hypothesis. 
Note that Figure 2 likewise does not weight the examiner’s placebo rates by the number of reviews 
that they do. 
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examining attorneys’ inherent publication tendencies demonstrate a 
degree of spread that corresponds closely with that of the unadjusted 
rates from Figure 1. 
Figures 1 and 3—and the associated statistics—clearly reject the 
notion of a unitary Trademark Office. However, do Figures 1 and 3 
indeed imply that—at least in terms of the publication decision—there 
are as many Trademark Offices as there are trademark-examining 
attorneys? Not exactly. There is some degree of concentration in 
behavior around the mean. In particular, there are plenty of examining 
attorneys that exhibit similar behaviors. As such, it is tough to say that 
each examining attorney is completely independent of one another. 
However, there indeed appears to be a notable range in an applicant’s 
chances of publication that depends on the random allocation of their 
application to their assigned examining attorney. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIOUS OUTCOMES 
ACROSS SAMPLE OF TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RATE OF FRAME OF 
DURATION 
PUBLICATION REFERENCE:
PUBLICATION SUSTAINED- (DAYS UNTIL 
WITHOUT ANY REGISTRATION PATENT 
RATE (RAW) OPPOSITION PUBLICATION 
REFUSAL RATE (RAW) APPLICATION 
RATE (RAW) DECISION,
ACTION GRANT RATE 
RAW)
(RAW) (RAW) 
Mean (of 
Distribution of 
0.783 0.405 0.579 0.007 314.761 0.682 
Relevant 
Examiner Rate) 
Standard 
Deviation (of 
Distribution of 0.115 0.161 0.136 0.006 134.863 0.197 
Relevant 
Examiner Rate) 
Coefficient of 
Variation (of 
Distribution of 0.15 0.40 0.24 0.85 0.43 0.29 
Relevant 
Examiner Rate) 
F-statistic (Testing 
for Equivalence of 69.115 220.656 4.363 290.067 63.19 
55.405 
Relevant Rates (p-value: (p-value: (p-value: (p-value: (p-value:
(p-value: 0.000)
Across 0.000) 0.000) 0.000) 0.000) 0.000) 
Examiners) 
Source: Trademark Case Files Dataset (for trademark measures) and Patent Office PAIR Database (for patent 
measures). Trademark data statistics are based on a sample of decisions by 1,308 trademark-examining attorneys 
practicing at the Trademark Office since 1982. The reported statistics are not weighted by the number of lifetime 
reviews by such examining attorneys. The examiner-level data, in turn, derives from data covering 7.8 million 
trademark applications since 1982. 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIOUS OUTCOMES 
ACROSS SAMPLE OF TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS, AFTER 
ADJUSTING RELEVANT EXAMINER MEASURES FOR VARIOUS 
UNDERLYING APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PUBLICATION 
RATE 
(ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER 
FIXED EFFECTS)
RATE OF 
PUBLICATION 
WITHOUT ANY 
REFUSAL ACTION 
(ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXED 
EFFECTS)
REGISTRATION 
RATE 
(ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER 
FIXED EFFECTS)
SUSTAINED-
OPPOSITION 
RATE 
(ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER 
FIXED 
EFFECTS)
DURATION (DAYS 
UNTIL PUBLICATION 
DECISION,
ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXED 
EFFECTS)
Mean (of 
Distribution 
of Relevant -0.003 0.037 -0.029 0.000 -20.352
Examiner 
Rate)
Standard 
Deviation (of 
Distribution 
0.112 0.150 0.123 0.022 67.948
of Relevant 
Examiner 
Rate)
Source: Trademark Case Files Dataset (for trademark measures). To derive the fixed-effects measures 
reported in Columns 1–5, we take an application-level dataset (covering over 7.8 million applications since 
1982) and regress the relevant application-level measure—for example, the incidence of publication in the 
case of Column 1—on a full set of year-fixed effects (based on the time of filing) and application 
characteristics, along with a full set of examining-attorney fixed effects. The reported statistics in Table 2 are 
based on the estimates of the resulting examining-attorney fixed effects across the 1,308 trademark-examining 
attorneys in the sample. The reported summary statistics (for these estimated fixed effects) are not weighted 
by the number of lifetime reviews by such examining attorneys. 
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FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATION RATES 
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO-
PUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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FIGURE 3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXEDEFFECTS FOR PUBLICATION RATES 
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING 
ATTORNEYS
B. Analysis of Publication Rates on First Substantive Decisions 
We next explore the degree of variation across trademark-
examining attorneys in the rate by which they decide to publish 
applications on the first substantive decision as opposed to deciding to 
publish after a previous office action in which they had denied the 
application for certain stated reasons. Again, to be clear, by this rate, 
we refer to the percentage of applications reviewed by an examining 
attorney that they decide to publish on the first substantive decision. 
At the outset, it is important to note that this outcome arguably 
merits separate attention from the above publication-rate analysis. 
Consider two otherwise identical applications, one of which is 
published on the first decision with no pushback by the examining 
attorney and the other of which is only published after the examining 
attorney issues an office action to reject on certain grounds—for 
example, that the desired mark is not distinctive enough. The fact that 
both otherwise identical applications are ultimately published does not 
mean that both processes bring us to the same point. The scope of 
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trademark protection received by the applicant whose publication 
decision was rendered on the first decision is likely to be broader, an 
outcome that is of relevance both to the consumers whose interests are 
ultimately at stake and to the applicant’s bottom line itself.84 
As demonstrated by Table 1, this first-decision-publication 
outcome occurs at a notably lower rate relative to the incidence of any 
publication outcome at all. Applications are published on the first 
decision only 40.5 percent of the time. Interestingly, the degree to 
which examining attorneys vary in this outcome is markedly greater— 
in both absolute and relative terms—than the degree to which they 
vary in publishing the application at all. The standard deviation in first-
decision-publication rates is 16.1 percent, suggesting that the standard 
degree of swing in these rates ranges from roughly 24.5 to 56.5 percent. 
The most straightforward way to compare the degree of variation in 
the first-decision-publication rate and the overall publication rate is to 
compare the associated COV, which, as above, normalizes the standard 
deviations by the respective means to provide a relative sense of the 
degree of spread involved. The COV with respect to the first-decision 
outcome is over twice as large as the any-publication outcome (0.40 vs. 
0.15). 
As with the any-publication outcome, we can likewise easily reject 
that the observed variation in first-decision-publication rates is due to 
chance alone, with the p-value of the associated F-test being below 
0.0001. Likewise, similar to the any-publication case, we find a nearly 
identical standard deviation—15 percent—when we adjust each 
examining attorney’s first-decision-publication rate for a range of 
application characteristics (see Table 2). 
In Figures 4–6, we replicate the pattern of frequency distributions 
depicted in Figures 1–3 but now focus on the first-decision-publication 
rate. We observe a wide spread in raw first-decision-publication rates 
(Figure 4) that persists even when we partial out the influence of 
application characteristics (Figure 6). Moreover, the degree of this 
spread is strikingly larger relative to that depicted when showing the 
variation in placebo first-publication decision rates (Figure 5).85 The 
extremes of the possible outcomes are particularly striking. Consider 
the comparison we executed above in the case of the overall 
 84. See Graham et al., supra note 10, at 7–9. 
85. As with the any-publication analysis, we also conduct a rationality check on this placebo 
analysis and test the null hypothesis that examiners’ first-decision placebo publication rates are 
all the same. With a p-value of 0.19 for the associated test, we cannot reject this null hypothesis.  
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publication-rate decision—that is, let us look at the distribution of 
publication rates on the first decision across all examining attorneys 
and compare the relevant rate at the 2nd percentile of this distribution 
with the rate at the 98th percentile of this distribution. At the 2nd 
percentile of this across-examining-attorney distribution, the first-
publication rate is 11 percent. At the 98th percentile, on the other hand, 
it is nearly 84 percent. As such, if we took fifty applicants at random 
again, one of them would be assigned to a reviewing attorney that 
would provide them with a less than 11 percent chance of succeeding 
on the first substantive decision, whereas another one of those 
applicants will be assigned to an examining attorney that would 
provide them with a greater than 84 percent chance of succeeding on 
that first decision. 
All told, the likelihood that an application receives a positive 
publication decision on the first substantive review by the trademark-
examining attorney depends heavily upon the examining attorney to 
whom the applicant is randomly assigned. 
FIGURE 4: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST-DECISION 
PUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO FIRST-
DECISION PUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS 
TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
FIGURE 6: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXEDEFFECTS FOR FIRST-DECISION PUBLICATION 
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING 
ATTORNEYS
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C. Registration-Rate Analysis 
The rate by which trademark-examining attorneys’ underlying 
applications are ultimately registered—again, as a fraction of 
applications reviewed—likewise varies notably across examiners. This 
variation was slightly higher relative to the variation in publication 
rates, with a COV of 0.24 in registration rates in comparison with the 
COV of 0.15 in the publication-rate context. But it was less so relative 
to the variation in first-decision publication decisions, where the COV 
was 0.40. The average publication rate across our sample of trademark 
applications is roughly 58 percent, with a standard deviation of 13.6 
percent around this mean. Accordingly, the standard degree of 
publication-rate swing ranges from roughly 46 to 72 percent. As 
demonstrated by the frequency distribution depicted in Figure 7, the 
range of publication rates is even larger when considering the outliers 
on both ends of the distribution. Although the vast bulk of examining 
attorneys are associated with registration rates spanning from 40 to 80 
percent, the distribution does span from a small but meaningful mass 
at 0 all the way up to 100 percent. 
Consistent with the above analyses, this spread also cannot be 
explained by variations in the composition of applications reviewed 
across examiners, as demonstrated by the frequency distribution of 
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects for registration rates 
depicted in Figure 9, whose standard deviation is slightly smaller but 
not meaningfully smaller than that of the distribution of raw 
registration rates. 
Further, we confirm that these variations are indeed real and not 
the product of sampling error, with a p-value of less than 0.000 
indicating a high degree of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis 
of no variation in registration rates across examining attorneys. 
Graphically reinforcing this inference, we also find that the actual 
degree of spread in registration rates across examiners depicted in 
Figure 7 is notably wider than the spread in placebo registration rates 
depicted in Figure 8.86 
86. As with the publication-rate outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that these placebo registration rates are equal across examining 
attorneys. 
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FIGURE 7: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF REGISTRATION 
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING 
ATTORNEYS
FIGURE 8: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO 
REGISTRATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
? 
??????? ? ??????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1844 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1807? 
FIGURE 9: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXEDEFFECTS FOR REGISTRATION RATES 
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING 
ATTORNEYS
D. Sustained-Opposition-Rate Analysis 
We next turn to an evaluation of an outcome that is not necessarily 
a specific decision made by the trademark-examining attorney but that 
is arguably a reflection of the quality of work completed by the 
trademark-examining attorney. For these purposes, we consider the 
likelihood that the underlying application ultimately leads to a third-
party opposition that is sustained by the TTAB. We calculate this 
sustained-opposition rate using the number of sustained oppositions 
associated with an examining attorney’s reviews as the numerator and 
all of the applications reviewed by the examining attorney as the 
denominator.87 
87. Although it would indeed be an interesting exercise, we leave it for future analysis to 
consider variation in sustained-opposition rates across applications conditional on the level of 
publication rates of the associated examining attorney. For instance, conditional on the 
applications gained approval from a lenient examining attorney, what is the distribution of 
sustained-opposition rates across applications? To some extent this might provide interesting 
insights into the nature of the TTAB. Our goal in this Article, however, is to explore variability 
across trademark-examining attorneys. As such, to calculate an opposition rate specific to an 
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One important difference between the distribution of sustained-
opposition rates and the above distributions is that the rates of 
sustained oppositions are much lower, with a very meaningful mass at 
0. Nonetheless, despite this left censoring at 0 and this overall notably 
lower mean, we continue to document arguably significant variation 
relative to this mean. As demonstrated in Table 1, the average 
likelihood that an application is associated with a sustained opposition 
by TTAB is roughly 0.7 percent. That is, roughly 7 out of 1000 
applications reviewed by an average examiner are associated with a 
sustained opposition by TTAB. We find a standard deviation of 
roughly 0.6 percent around this mean, in which case we find a roughly 
0.85 COV with respect to this measure. This COV is notably higher 
than the degree of variation, relatively speaking, associated with the 
publication and registration outcomes. 
Figure 10 allows us to visualize this variation across examining 
attorneys. The large mass at 0 is evident from this figure, with roughly 
10 percent of trademark-examining attorneys not being associated with 
sustained oppositions. To provide a better sense of the right tail of this 
distribution, consider the examiner in the 98th percentile of the 
distribution of sustained-opposition rates across examining attorneys. 
Although the mean examining attorney is associated with roughly 7 out 
of 1000 applications receiving a sustained opposition, the examiner in 
the 98th percentile has a sustained opposition rate roughly three times 
that level, with roughly 22 out of 1000 applications receiving a 
sustained opposition. 
Interestingly, as can be visualized by the fixed-effects frequency 
distribution depicted in Figure 12 and by the reported standard 
deviation in Table 2 in comparison with Table 1, we actually find a 
wider degree of variation in this outcome when adjusting examining 
attorneys’ rates for the full set of observable application characteristics. 
Finally, we note that the F-test results suggest that we can easily 
reject the null hypothesis of equal sustained-opposition rates across 
examining attorneys, with a p-value of less than 0.000. Likewise, the 
degree of variation in actual and adjusted rates that we observe are 
greater than that observed of placebo sustained-opposition rates across 
examining attorneys (Figure 11), though arguably the difference 
examining attorney reflective of variability in this outcome across examining attorneys, it is 
natural to normalize this outcome by the reviews completed by that attorney.
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between actual and placebo variation appears smaller in this case 
relative to the publication- and registration-rate outcomes.88 
FIGURE 10: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SUSTAINED-
OPPOSITION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
88. As with the above outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we fail to reject 
the hypothesis that these placebo sustained-opposition rates are equal across examining 
attorneys. 
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FIGURE 11: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO 
SUSTAINED-OPPOSITION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS 
TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
FIGURE 12: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXEDEFFECTS FOR SUSTAINED-OPPOSITION 
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING 
ATTORNEYS
??????? ? ??????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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E. Application-Duration Analysis 
In our final empirical exercise, we explore a measure of processing 
efficiency. Specifically, we explore heterogeneity in the length of time 
in days it takes trademark-examining attorneys to reach a publication 
decision. For those applications that get published, this represents the 
length of time between the date of filing and the date of publication. 
For those applications that were not published, this represents the 
length of time between the date of filing and the date of abandonment 
of the application. We focus on the publication-rate duration rather 
than the length of time between filing and the date of registration given 
that examining attorneys arguably have greater control over the former 
and given the substantial impacts that application type—that is, use 
versus intent-to-use—have on the length of time between publication 
and registration. 
We find that, on average, it takes roughly 315 days to reach this 
publication decision, with a standard deviation around this mean of 
roughly 135 days (see Table 1). With a resulting COV of 0.43, this 
degree of heterogeneity is even greater than that associated with the 
publication rates and registration rates themselves. However, this 
duration outcome represents the one outcome in which we find that 
adjusting examining attorneys’ durations for the observation 
characteristics of the applications they review leads to a decent 
narrowing of this spread—much of this is due to controlling for the year 
in which the application is reviewed. We find that the standard 
deviation falls by roughly half when instead looking at the estimated 
examiner fixed effects for this measure (see Table 2). Even in this 
instance, however, we continue to observe a substantial degree of 
variation across trademark-examining attorneys in publication 
durations, with a standard degree of swing around the mean inherent-
duration length of over two months. This conclusion is reinforced by 
observing the full distribution of raw and adjusted publication-decision 
durations, as depicted in Figures 13 and 15. 
In Figure 14, we present the distribution of placebo publication-
decision durations across examining attorneys. The degree of actual 
variation considerably exceeds the degree of this placebo variation in 
publication-decision durations, bolstering the inference that examiners 
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vary considerably in their review durations.89 The results of the 
associated F-test only reinforce this conclusion (see Table 1). 
FIGURE 13: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATION-DECISION 
DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
89. To generate a placebo duration, we assign each application a random placebo value 
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 315 and a standard deviation of 135—that is, the 
mean and standard deviation from the actual empirical distribution of durations from our data. 
As with the other outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that these placebo duration values are equal across examining attorneys.  
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FIGURE 14: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO 
PUBLICATION-DECISION DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED)
ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
FIGURE 15: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 
EXAMINER FIXEDEFFECTS FOR PUBLICATION-DECISION 
DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-
EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The above empirical analysis raises clear concerns over the 
inequities of the administrative process by demonstrating that the 
examining attorney to which applicants are randomly assigned may 
have a substantial bearing on their likelihood of being published; their 
likelihood of being registered; the scope of any ultimate protection 
received (as proxied by an allowance for publication on the first 
substantive decision); their likelihood of having a third party 
successfully oppose their application; and the speed by which they 
receive a decision by the Trademark Office. Again, to use the example 
from above, if one took fifty trademark applicants at random, one of 
them would receive an examining attorney offering a chance of success 
at the publication stage as low at 56 percent, whereas another one of 
those fifty applicants would receive a chance of success as high as 100 
percent based on her assigned examining attorney. This disparity is 
striking considering that the publication-rate distribution is the tightest 
of those that we depict. The spreads in the other outcomes that we 
explore—in relative, unit-free terms—are even greater. This degree of 
substantial variation in outcomes across trademark-examining 
attorneys remains true even after accounting for a rich degree of 
application characteristics that may also impact these outcomes. 
Considering that the registrability criteria are meant to track the 
economic justifications for trademark protection, one might assume 
that, conditional on the relevant application parameters, there exists 
an ideal social welfare maximizing manner of applying these criteria. 
Yet the fact that we observe such notable variations in important 
Trademark Office outcomes across examining attorneys suggests that 
the Trademark Office may be erring considerably—perhaps on either 
side—in attaining any such ideal. In turn, the consequences may 
involve considerable social welfare losses. 
Of course, heterogeneity is not necessarily problematic from a 
social welfare perspective to the extent that it reflects experimentation 
across the examining corps—that is, an attempt to uncover what this 
ideal decision-making process looks like. However, if one thought that 
the variation that we observed represents beneficial degrees of 
experimentation, then one would expect that we would nonetheless 
begin to observe convergence over time as examining attorneys learn 
from prior experimentation and begin to coalesce around optimal 
practices. Unfortunately, we do not find robust markers suggestive of 
any such convergence. Consider, for instance, the publication decision. 
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The COV in publication rates across examiners is just as high in the 
2010s as it was in the 1980s. 
To be clear, rampant variations in outcomes across randomly 
assigned examining attorneys implicate more than just concerns over 
economic efficiency. They also raise apprehensions over the 
distribution of resources across applicants, along with concerns over 
administrative justice. 
Ultimately, given that heterogeneity in trademark-examining-
attorney behaviors threatens both equity and social welfare, it is 
important for future research in this area to identify the sources of such 
heterogeneity. With such information in hand, either the Trademark 
Office or Congress can be in a position to adopt personnel, training, 
supervising, and related policies to reduce these disparities while at the 
same time converging practices around the social welfare maximizing 
approaches. 
The patent side of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has 
arguably received more attention on such matters. Professors Iain 
Cockburn, Samuel Kortum, and Scott Stern’s noteworthy article 
demonstrated similar concerns in the patent context.90 Their analysis 
inspired us to conduct a series of studies to unpack the determinants of 
patent-examiner grant rates and the variation in such rates across 
examiners, among other Patent Office outcomes. Through this series 
of studies, we have found that key determinants of patent-examiner 
behavior include (1) the fee structure of the agency, which creates 
grant incentives that vary across technologies and applicant types;91 (2) 
the availability of repeat-filing mechanisms, which likewise creates 
grant incentives that vary across technologies;92 (3) the amount of time 
extended to patent examiners, which varies across technology and 
examiner General-Schedule pay level along with the experience level 
of the examiner;93 (4) the patent examiner’s hiring-year cohort, which 
 90. See Iain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal? 
Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in Patents in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy 19, 28 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
91. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
67, 70, 96 (2013).
92. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 617 
(2015). 
93. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Microlevel Application 
Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 550–51 (2017). 
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may be strongly influenced by the agency-driven culture under which 
they were trained—a culture that is known to vary considerably over 
time within the Patent Office;94 and (5) patent examiners’ peer 
groups.95 
Though Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern did not consider the patent-
application grant rate among their outcomes of consideration, we 
demonstrate in Table 1 of this Article that patent-application grant 
rates do vary considerably across patent examiners, with a COV of 
0.29, which roughly corresponds with the degree of variation 
documented in the trademark context. In light of the equitable and 
welfare harms that may stem from disparities in trademark-examining-
attorney decision-making, it is time for the Trademark Office to get as 
much attention in such matters as has been received by the Patent 
Office, both by policymakers and by researchers interested in 
uncovering the causes of such disparities. 
CONCLUSION
This Article conducts the first large-scale examination of 
trademark-examining-attorney decision-making. We find meaningful 
variation in trademark examiners’ registration rates, first-substantive-
review publication rates, overall publication rates, and sustained-
opposition rates at TTAB, along with meaningful variation in the speed 
by which the examining attorney provides a final decision. These 
differences hold even after accounting for a rich degree of application 
characteristics that may also impact these outcomes. Such differences 
in trademark-examining-attorney determinations raise concerns 
regarding equity and social welfare. Future research is needed to 
determine the causes of the heterogeneity documented in this Article 
and provide the Trademark Office with guidance as to how to bring 
more homogeneity to trademark-examiner decisions. 
94. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601, 
1605 (2016). 
95. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Knowledge Spillovers and Learning in the 
Workplace: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Office 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24159, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24159.pdf [https://perma.cc/97AF-
CAQU].
